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INTRODUCTION: ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE
ENERGY PROBLEM
RALPH F. FucHst

This issue of the Indiana Law Journal focuses on an area of social
policy and governmental action in which one of the major dilemmas that
confront mankind in these last decades of the twentieth century is acutely
presented. The rate at which energy is consumed in our society continues
to increase geometrically in relation to the growth of population. Most of
the needed energy comes from fossil or nuclear fuel, the conversion of
which, by burning or breakdown in furnaces into usable heat, light or
power, pollutes or damages the environment in a variety of ways. The extraction of fossil fuels1 and the creation of hydroelectric power-generating facilities also give rise to ecological problems, as does the transmission
of fuel or energy by pipeline, marine tanker or high-tension electric power
lines. Conflicts among the needs to satisfy immediate energy consumption
demands, to conserve resources and to preserve the environment often
arise. The resulting complex of interrelated issues requires that short-run
and long-range considerations be weighed when action is taken on proposals to provide or expand energy facilities or to formulate regulations to
govern such facilities. Of transcending importance in itself, this situation
exemplifies a wider range of problems which institutional decision makers,
especially in government, must somehow learn to meet whenever decisions
are to be reached on socially useful proposals that also endanger the environment.
It is an obvious truth, still not sufficiently understood, that the thin
crust of the earth on which mankind lives, by extraction and processing of
resources and disposal of wastes, is for the first time being strained in a
manner and to a degree that threatens the continuance of the ecological
system it sustains and, therefore, that the very survival of humanity under
tolerable conditions is in jeopardy.' Within the hopefully expanding
t University Professor of Law Emeritus, Indiana University School of Law.
1. See Note, Strip Mining of Coal: A Federal Response to State Legislation, infra
at 771.
2. The causes of this situation, which has developed largely since World War
II, have recently been well discussed in B. CommoNE, THE CLOSING CIRCLE (1971).

The author emphasizes a cumulation of recent technological changes as critically important at the present time. Among these, which have been imposed on the situation
created by prior population growth, industrialization and urbanization, are (1) the
replacement in common use of many organic and mineral products by synthetic ones,
such as plastics and man-made fibers, which require the consumption of energy in
factories for their production and create concentrations of wastes in the process; (2)
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boundaries set by an increasingly refined technology, man must find ways
to restrict his usage to the earth's capacity to respond healthily and must
learn to adjust the burdens he imposes to the variety and geographical
distribution of available resources. All relevant knowledge, much of it
still to be gained, has to be brought to bear on problems as they arise;
competing interests have to be evaluated; workable solutions have to be
reached through a process of adjustment.
Traditionally in our private enterprise system, many of the basic
decisions in matters relating to energy supply have been made by business
enterprises according to a calculus of those costs and returns that are reflected in corporate books of account, modified by the requirements of
government regulation. This regulation has been mainly in the economic
interest of consumers or in the interest of the health and safety of persons
closely affected, such as employees, neighbors or purchasers of products.
Now, in the interest of conservation of resources and preservation of the
environment, longer-range considerations must also be taken into account.
They can either be translated into monetary costs by means of governmental fees, taxes or damage assessments, imposed on conduct which is
to be discouraged, or be implemented by legal prohibitions, restrictions or
requirements enforceable in various ways.' Expanded attention to the
publicly important ingredients of decisions can result in part, even in
private enterprises, from informal pressures of public opinion and a
developing ethic of business management; but competitive forces which
tend to impose the cheapest practices on private decision-making render
legal regulation inevitable and, because of geographical rivalry, require
that much of this regulation be controlled or administered by the federal
government through both national and international arrangements. The
structure and processes of government involved in this regulation and the
complex of legal rights to be considered receive attention in the pages that
follow.'
the widespread, intensive use of chemical fertilizers in agriculture, with resultant run-

off of nitrogen and phosphates into streams and lakes; (3) the fattening of cattle in
concentrated feed-lots in place of pastures where wastes can be assimilated into the soil
and (4) the vast increase of the burning of fossil fuel in relatively inefficient vehicles
of small size. To these might be added mankind's pursuit of salubrious climates in
which to live and carry on production, requiring heavy use of water and power in
arid areas that otherwise would remain ecologically far less disturbed. Some of the
problems posed by this last development are discussed in Note, The Four Corners Power
Complex: Pollution on the Reser&vation, infra at 704.
3. For an analysis of the alternative governmental techniques involved, see Katz,
Decision-Making in the Prodution of Power, ScENrlrrc AmERICAN, Sept., 1971, at

191-200.
4. Much of the literature dealing with ecological problems, written by scientists
and advocates of ecological safeguards, is successful in identifying causes of the present
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The legislature is, of course, the governmental body that must act
in the first instance to bring legal measures into operation. It has power
to act definitively, within constitutional limits, but more often delegates
authority. The knowledge needed for the formulation of precise rules is
often lacking; yet the problems to be dealt with may be too urgent to permit continued inaction. Even when specific solutions could be devised
on the basis of available information, the clash of powerful interests in
the arena of a representative body is likely to produce a stalemate unless
some means of acting without making final choices can be devised. The
obvious expedient, often resorted to for one or both of the foregoing
reasons, is legislation which specifies goals, enumerates factors to be considered in devising further measures to attain these goals, establishes one
or more specialized administrative agencies charged with formulating
these measures, and prescribes the rudiments of the procedures to be used
and the sanctions to be employed. Hopefully, agency expertise, applied
to expanded data and cognizant of varied views, will provide acceptable
solutions despite the political factors involved. The legal duty of an agency
to act, imposed by the legislature, will avoid total inaction and produce
measures that can at least be tried and, if they are not irreversible, be more
flexible than a detailed statute.5
Such broad delegation of power to agencies raises constitutional
issues, of course; but even though there remains a requirement that the
legislative power be genuinely exercised by the legislature,6 this responsibility is fulfilled if objectives--even conflicting objectives-are stated in
a statute and an agency is required to take action to serve them through
ecological situation and in outlining solutions that should be reached but hardly
attempts to propose institutional arrangements that might accomplish these solutions.
5. See Stone, The Twentieth Century Administratkve E.xcplosion and After, 52
CALIF. L. REV. 513 (1964):
[Tihe truth is that the legislative or community consensus sometimes extends
only to the decision that the particular area should somehow be legally controlled. The allocation of administrative power then presents itself as the only
means of preventing that limited community consensus from being frustrated
by continuing disagreement as to the appropriate means.
Id. at 520 (emphasis in the original). See also J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO,
CESS 51 (1938). By contrast, Landis also refers to "the impossibility of delegating to
the administrative the responsibility of making policy from the very irresolution of
the legislature"; for when competing postulates as to the desirable action to take
have so enlisted the loyalties and faiths of classes of people, the choice, to have
that finality and moral sanction necessary for enforcement, must, as a practical
matter, be made according to a method which resolves it as if it were one of
power rather than one of judgment.
Id. at 59-60.
6. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Refining Co v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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measures that are grounded in proper procedures.' The difficult issue
surrounding such legislation is not constitutional but whether particular
problems are best resolved by this kind of agency action or by the more
largely political processes of a representative assembly.'
It is no accident, then, that administrative agency action has become
the principal reliance of government in its efforts to resolve ecological and
other large-scale problems of modern society, just as the same or other
agencies were earlier charged with providing solutions to less pervasive
difficulties. A forerunner of this expanded role occurred with respect to
the Interstate Commerce Commission. The legislative desire to eliminate
certain evils in the railroad industry led to the establishment of the Commission in 1887.' After additional needs came to be felt, the fostering of
an efficient, justly operated, coordinated land transportation system was
made the prescribed goal of the Commission's actions under the Transportation Acts of 1920 and 1940.10 The shift of emphasis was prophetic,
even though it was only dimly understood and never adequately implemented. 1 Today in still larger matters the National Environmental
Policy Act' (NEPA) and its implementing Reorganization Plan ' not
only enunciate expanded goals' but establish new agencies to pursue
them, 5 impose new duties on existing administrative bodies 6 and prescribe procedures to be employed.' Included in these procedures are processes of coordination among agencies and among federal and state
governments which go considerably beyond those previously existing.'8
7. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
8. Cf. Caldwell, A National Policy for Energy, infra at 624; Fuchs, The New
Administrative State: Judicial Sanction for Agency Self-Determination in the Reguc-

lation of Industry, 69 COLUm. L. REv. 216 (1969) ; Tarlock, Book Review, 47
406, 407 (1972).
9. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
10.

See I.

SHARFMAN,

IND.

L.J.

THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION pt. 1, at 184-87

(1931).
11. Together with great extensions of the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the 1940 Act enunciated a comprehensive "National Transportation Policy,"
54 Stat. 899, now printed in the historical note preceding 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 elt seq. (1970).
13. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 5 U.S.C. App. 609 (1970).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970) (Council on Environmental Quality); 42 U.S.C.
8 4372 (1970) (Office of Environmental Quality) ; Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 5 U.S.C.
App. 609 (1970) (Environmental Protection Agency).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332-33 (1970).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). See also Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. §§ 531,
532 (1971), 42 U.S.C. § 4321, note (1970); Statement on Proposed Federal Actions
Affecting the Environment: Guidelines, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as CEQ Guidelines].
18. Interagency coordination is similary prescribed in some recent state environmental legislation. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, § 1047 (1971); Comment,
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Legislation dealing with less pervasive, but still large-scale, contemporary
problems does not go so far; but generally in both federal and state administration the emphasis is on ways of coping with large problems in an
adequate manner and with sufficient insight to meet particular needs, utilizing "inputs" of data and opinions, rational processes of decision, and
advice and action by technically qualified officials.' " To serve as a check
on due performance of agency duties, enlarged possibilities of judicial
review of agency action and inaction have become available.
Against the background of these developments, opposition to the
growth of bureaucracy as an evil in itself seems archaic and is in fact diminishing, although criticism of alleged bureaucratic indifference and ineptitude is increasing. Society is coming to recognize that new agencies
and augmented powers for old ones are necessary if not inevitable.2" Tax
increases to support enlarged government functions are contemplated.
Yet there is a resulting intensified need for a discriminating choice of
measures to be adopted, so as to restrict governmental proliferation and
costs so far as possible and permit the private marketplace to make the
decisions it is capable of rendering. 2 Despite this need for prudence, no
Thermal Electric Power and Water Pollution: A Siting Approach, 46 Im. L.J. 61,
94-97 (1970) ; Note, State Regulation of Power Plant Siting, infra at 742. Federal-state
and federal-local coordination have long been required under federal-aid legislation,
with more limited objectives than under the environmental protection laws. As to
federal-state action in the establishment and enforcement of air and water quality
standards, see 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970) (air) ; 33 U.S.C. § 1160(b) (1970) (water).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 421 (1970), under which the initial determination of disability
for federal disability insurance purposes may be delegated to state agencies by agreement. As to the operation of certain of these laws, see J. DAVIES, THE POLITICS OF
POLLUTION (1970) ; Kline, Intergovernmental Relations in the Control of Water Pollution, 4 NATuRAL REsouRcEs LAW. 505 (1971).
19. The formulation of, among others, transportation safety regulations, rules
governing safety in employment and food and drug standards proceeds in this fashion.
An important development, aiding the performance of a difficult task, was an interagency
agreement Which made the assistance of experts serving the National Academy of
Sciences-National Research Council available to the Food and Drug Administration
in the determination of the efficacy of drugs under the 1962 amendments to the Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Act. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified in scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C.). For an account of this development, see Note, Drug Efficacy and the
1962 Anendments, 60 GEo. L.J. 185, 207-13 (1971).
20. Cf. C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA 356 (1970), insisting upon immediate, exclusive attention to the goal of "a new way of life" as the future is debated, but
stating also that his "Consciousness III . . . does not propose to abolish law,
organization, or government," but that "it asks instead that they serve rational, human
ends."
21. Currently there is a widespread belief that deregulation of large portions of
the transportation industry would result in improved, less costly service under the
spur of competition. Unregulated producers' natural gas prices, in place of the regulation
by the Federal Power Commission that began in 1954, might have resulted in a better
allocation of resources and a more adequate supply, relative to current demand, than the
Commission has been able to bring about. See Note, Natural Gas and the Federal Power
Commission,infra at 725.
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viable alternative to an increasing reliance on government agencies has
emerged. Population problems, human conflict, technological change and
demands for greater welfare will continue and will not be harnessed or
subdued without additional governmental measures to deal with them.
The observation that administration by persons in authority, especially
in government, is as much a part of the human condition as the physical
environment was never before quite so true as it is today. 2
The articles and notes that follow, dealing with specific consequences,
in an energy context, of the factors just outlined, may render additional
comments at this point superfluous. Nevertheless, it is possible that some
common threads in the situations covered, identified by their relation to
recent widespread administrative law developments, can usefully be drawn
together. This, at any rate, is the task which will be undertaken in the
ensuing paragraphs.
OPEN PROCEEDINGS IN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

The importance of specialization and expertise in the operation of
administrative agencies has long been recognized." The need for them
in determining policies and taking action with respect to energy and, more
generally, in dealing with ecological and other large-scale problems of
modern society is evident. Some agencies are specifically equipped by
knowledge and training to exercise judgment respecting only some of the
factors involved in the situations that confront them; but if so, they can
be equipped to gather and consider additional relevant data and opinions.
They will, in any event, have the head start of partial built-in knowledge
in the effort to reach sound solutions, such as the Federal Power Commission has with respect to hydroelectric power station sites and the
Federal Highway Administration has with respect to the location of roads.
This partial expertise may obviously give rise to a narrow approach to
problems and create a danger of bias against viewpoints from beyond its
purview;24 but the participation of additional agencies, differently
oriented, may be invoked-as it actually has been 2 5-in mitigation of this
22.

Cf. E. REDFORD, DEMOCRACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 179,

Fuchs, Governmental Decision-Making in the Great Society, 1968

366.

23.

WASH.

196 (1969) ;
U.L.Q. 361,

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoMm. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT

S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1941).
24.
(1967),

The Supreme Court, for example, in Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 435-50
whether justly or not (cf. Harlan,

3.,

dissenting, id. at 451), criticized the

power-development orientation of the FPC which led it, in the Court's view, to give
inadequate attention to fish and wildlife factors that had been called to its attention,
before authorizing a major power project.
25. See note 18, supra.
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hazard, at the same time as hearings and other means of ascertaining unofficial information and opinion are also employed.26
A frequent observation with respect to ecological problems is that
the most important choices to be made in determining policy involve value
judgments as to the relative desirability or undesirability of feasible alternatives, in addition to technical knowledge and judgment. Social scientists
such as psychologists, sociologists and economists have contributions to
make in these matters, as do practitioners of such applied sciences as
management, social work and planning; yet within the limits set by technology and by expertly determined costs, decisions in a democracy should
be shaped primarily by the needs and desires of the general population
who must pay the costs and who will be most significantly affected by the
outcome. To a large extent these needs and desires are best known to
those who experience them. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to suppose
that, as to environmental matters, the simple ascertainment of relevant
popular desires (whether by vote or, hopefully, by the formation of a consensus after open hearings or the use of other means of communication,
such as negotiation) is necessarily a superior method of decision to, a less
political process-not only because of technical factors involved but also
because of conflicts of view and the difficulty of foresight. Many a prized
public asset, including a sizable number of monuments, museums, parks
and transportation facilities, might never have come into existence if
initial popular choice had been a prerequisite to, their creation. Of course,
disastrous mistakes have also been made by headstrong persons in authority; and resort to popular decision, as in local bond-issue elections, is often
salutary; yet a dominant role for common sense preferences is not likely
to provide the best answers to all problems. Hence, even in a democracy,
many matters are willingly entrusted to the determination of experts hopefully cognizant of social needs which may as yet be only imperfectly perceived.
The provision which has been made for interested individuals and
groups to come forward as participants, orally or in writing, in proceed26. Even apart from the requirements of NEPA, the Power Commission and
other agencies have recently weighed environmental factors more fully than used to
be the case before taking final action. Jaffe, Book Review, 84 HAv. L. REV. 1562,
1565-66 (1971) ; Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.
1971) (where, however, the Commission had acted pursuant to the court's prior
remand of the proceedings). Compare Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., 39 F.P.C. 294,
308-12 (1968) (Ross, Comm'r, dissenting), with Stitt, Paul H. & Loretta, 39 F.P.C. 323
(1968). As to the Atomic Energy Commission, see Note, The National Environmental
Policy Act, the Freedom of Information Act and the Atomic Energy Commission: The
Need for Environmental Information, infra at 755.
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ings under NEPA2 7 carries forward an accelerating tendency in federal
agency action over the years. This tendency was given impetus by the
rulemaking provision of the federal Administrative Procedure Act,2"
which is applicable to the formulation by agencies of legally binding substantive rules.29 This provision requires the publication in the Federal
Register of notice of proposed rulemaking, inviting the submission of
data, views or arguments from interested persons to be considered by the
agency. Trade association and other interest groups often disseminate
these announcements further, in addition to responding themselves. Moreover, it has become a fairly common practice for agencies to employ these
processes in rulemaking, even when the Act does not require them;3° and
similar procedures may be used, without legal compulsion, in performing
other agency functions, such as the issuance of licenses or permits, when
they are of substantial public importance. 3' Even in trial-type adjudication, which is required to be made on the basis of the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, opportunity is increasingly offered for interested persons and groups to intervene as parties or participate in other
ways.2 This practice became virtually mandatory in numerous situations
by reason of the decisions of two influential courts of appeals in the Scenic
Hudson3 and United Church of Christ4 cases, involving licensing pro27. Building on a provision of NEPA for agencies to take account of "presently
unquantified environmental amenities and values" [42 U.S.C. § 4332(B) (1970)] in
making determinations which are subject to the Act, the Guidelines of the Council on
Environmental Quality specify that "the fullest practicable provision" should be made
for obtaining the views of interested parties, including, "whenever appropriate, provision
for public hearings." CEQ Guidelines, supra note 17, at 7726 (§ 10(e)).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
30. The issuance by the Internal Revenue Service of interpretative regulations,
agency rules of practice and declaratory policy statements, which are not subject to
the Act, is often, in practice, preceded by agency hearings. Cf. Bonfield, Some Tentalive Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making of Interpretative Rules and
GeneralStatements of Policy Under the A.P.A., 23 AD. L. Rxv. 101 (1971).
31. The CEQ Guidelines encourage such proceedings in the performance of all
kinds of agency functions. CEQ Guidelines, supra note 17, at 7726 (§ 10 (e)).
32. See Note, Public Interest Right to Participate in Federal Adlmiznistrative
Agency Proceedings: Scope and Effect, infra at 682. The National Labor Relations
Board, which has avoided the use of its rulemaking authority to lay down general
policies, resorts instead to pronouncements in the course of its unfair labor practice
and other decisions. These sometimes follow presentations of views by selected nonparties to the adjudicatory proceedings, pursuant to Board invitation. NLRB v. WymanGordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 763 (1969) ; Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule
Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALF L.J. 571, 596-99
(1970) ; Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board's Performance in
Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 254, 260-72
(1968).
33. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965)
(decision dealing primarily with agency duty to develop facts and with parties' standing
in court).
34. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
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ceedings in which the courts held that agencies, charged with duties to
provide in their actions for certain public interests, are obligated to admit
community groups representing those interests to the proceedings and to
consider the contentions of these groups seriously.
Advances in these forms of "participatory democracy" in agency proceedings, together with pressures for their further extension, continue to
emerge. Responding to a recommendation of the Public Lands Law Review Commission, the Department of the Interior recently announced a
general policy of affording opportunity for public participation in all of
its rulemaking proceedings whenever feasible, whether or not statutes so
require."5 The Corps of Engineers has adopted a similar policy with relation to its consideration of projects affecting navigable waters. 6 Even
the Federal Trade Commission, which previously carried the entire burden
of representing public interests in its cease-and-desist order proceedings,
has recently permitted outside groups to take part when it appeared that
they might be able to participate helpfully. 7 The Administrative Conference of the United States has adopted a recommendation that a policy
of encouraging and assisting these forms of public participation in government proceedings become government-wide."8 Further, it is coming to
be recognized that when the needs and desires of poor people are relevant
to agency proceedings, special measures to bring these interests to agency
attention are appropriate, because private resources for this purpose are
sparse and the interests involved lack political support and may be relatively strange to the decision makers. The Administrative Conference of
the United States has urged strongly, in consequence, that a governmentwide People's Counsel be provided to represent poor people in agency proceedings. 9 If this step were taken, a new dimension would be added to
proceedings involving the authorization of such projects as the construction of power plants or the strip mining of coal in areas where poor people
live.
EXPANDED APPLICATION OF THE FREEDOM

OF INFORMATION PRINCIPLE
Another strong recent tendency in federal administration, reflected
35. 36 Fed. Reg. 8336 (1971).
36. 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.120(f),(g) (1972).
19,373 (FTC
37. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 3 TRADE REa. REP.
1970) ; 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,519 (FTC 1971).
(Recom38. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 1971-72 ANN. REP. mendation No. 28); see National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d

725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

39. ADmINISTRATIV
tion No. 5).

CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,

1969

ANN. REP.

31

(Recommenda-
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in environmental proceedings, has resulted from the Freedom of Information Act,"° adopted as an amendment to the Administrative Procedure
Act in 1966. The Act imposes duties' which are largely nondiscretionary
on all federal agencies to make available to members of the public, on
request, information and documents in their possession, subject to exceptions which are specified. The courts have on the whole construed this
measure broadly. Its effectiveness has been somewhat impeded by restrictive agency interpretations and depends in part on the practicability of
litigation to enforce it; but enough cases are arising and reaching decision
to effectuate increasingly the principles of the statute."1 In line with these
disclosure principles, NEPA requires that the environmental impact statements accompanying agency actions in proceedings subject to the Act be
made public. 2 Carrying disclosure methods farther, the Guidelines of the
Council on Environmental Quality specify that draft environmental statements which are to become the subject of hearings are to be made available
in advance. 3 Later, the comments received from other agencies and from
nongovernment sources are also to be disclosed. As a result, interested
persons may participate in agency environmental proceedings with increased effectiveness; and the communications media, concerned organizations and the public at large are able to scrutinize with great thoroughness
the actions and proposed actions of agencies relating to projects which
significantly affect the environment."
40. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
41. The pertinent literature and decisions are cited in Note, The National Environmental Policy Act, the Freedom of Information Act and the Atomic Energy Cominission: The -Need for Eirirowniental Information, infra at 755. See ADmisTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF TrE U.S., 1970-71 ANN. REP. 51 (Recommendation No. 24); Symr-

posium: The Freedom of Information Act and the Agencies, 23 AD. L. REv. 129-67
(1971).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970).
43. CEQ Guidelines, supranote 17, at 7724 (§10(e)).
44. Id. at 7726 (§ 10(f)). The Guidelines refer specifically to the Freedom of
Information Act.
45. The consequences in nuclear power plant siting appear in Tarlock, Balancing
EnWironnental Considerations and Energy Demands: A Comment on Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, infra at 645. See also Note, The National
Environmental Policy Act, the Freedom of Information Act and the Atomic Energy
Commission: The Need for Environmental Information, infra at 755. The process

surrounding the recent authorization by the Secretary of Interior of a pipeline to
carry Alaskan North Slope oil across the state is another outstanding example. The
project was held up on a variety of legal grounds, including requirements of NEPA, by

two district court injunctions before an official draft environmental impact statement

covering the pipeline was filed. See Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422

(D.D.C. 1970). The proceedings then resulted, after hearings and written comments by
other agencies, in a massive statement which was published and received intensive scrutiny
by the persons concerned. Final action by the Secretary followed.
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THE ROLE OF TRIAL-TYPE ADJUDICATION

The enlargement and delay of administrative agency proceedings,
caused by a multiplication of participants and an expansion in the duties
of agencies to seek and consider their contentions and the communications
of other government agencies, may be mitigated by other recent developments in agency processes tending toward simplification and brevity.
There has also been an increase in due process rights to agency hearings
with many of the attributes of a trial, when significant personal interests
are involved in agency proceedings;4" but proceedings involving broad
interests in the environment, such as those under consideration in this
symposium, are not likely to be greatly affected by this development. Even
if they were to be, agency burdens could be reduced by an enlarging range
of devices now becoming available to avoid or shorten hearings. Thus,
the right to a hearing, even when it clearly exists, is recognized as subject
to a showing that the hearing, if held, would contribute to the outcome
of the proceeding. The agency can require a demonstration that serious
issues of fact, law or policy will be raised" and may tailor any hearing it
grants, involving the presentation of evidence or argument or both, to the
nature of the issues presented and the kinds of evidence to be adduced after
these have been limited by means of prehearing conferences.4" In these
46. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), epitomizes this development. The
Supreme Court held that whenever significant fact issues are present a recipient of
federal aid to the families of dependent children is entitled to a hearing with rights
of confrontation and cross-examination before the receipient's benefits can be withdrawn.
The procedural rights of recipients of governmental benefits have been steadily
expanded, even in the absence of judicially determined due process rights, by legislative
and agency actions over the past forty years which have recognized the human importance of the interests at stake. W. GELL31ORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
CASES AND COMMENTS 449-502, 553-67 & authorities cited (5th ed. 1970); Fuchs, The
Task of Procedure When Social Needs Become Legal Rights, 15 SocIAL SERV. REV.
721 (1941) ; Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 CoLUm. L. REv. 143
(1958). As to procedural rights in relation to other personal interests see GELLHORN &
BySE, supra, 569-601; Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney General, 454 F.2d
928 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972) ; Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971)
47. Municipal Light Bd. v. FPC, 450 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Pfizer, Inc.
v. Richardson, 434 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1970); Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir.
1970) ; Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 422 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1970) ; cf. Richardson v. Wright,
405 U.S. 208 (1972); Retail Store Employees Union v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir.
1970). See also ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 1970-71 ANN. REP. 42
(Recommendation No. 20) ; Gellhorn & Robinson, Summary Judgment in Administrative
Adjudication, 84 HARv. L. REV. 612 (1971).
48. Cf. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 1970-71 ANN. REP. 44 (Reccommendation No. 21). Miller, Ecology and the Administrative Process, 23 AD. L.
REV. 59 (1970) ; Hearing Examiners' Experience With Prehearing Conferences, in
FEDERAL HEARING EXAMINERS' FIFTH ANNUAL SEMINAR: PROCEEDINGS 72-90 (1967);
Symposium: Conduct of Administrative Proceedings-Pre-Trial Discovery Role of
the Examiner, 11 AD. L. BULL. 121-60 (1958).
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ways the formal hearing process becomes a much niore flexible and varied
vehicle than it has traditionally been.
Almost all agencies have general authority to issue regulations to aid
in the enforcement of the laws they administer." Most often the regulations issued pursuant to this authority are procedural or interpretative in
nature; but, in addition, the agencies increasingly use this general rulemaking power to eliminate issues from statutorily required formal proceedings by promulgating regulations that resolve those issues in advance
and foreclose their further consideration." The formulation of these
regulations is subject to the informal, participatory kind of proceedings
outlined above, which can be much more expeditious than the trial-type
hearings that would otherwise be required for the same issue each time a
case involving it arose. There are limits to the substitution of rulemaldng
for adjudication in this way; ' but as these limits have recently been defined, they allow large scope for agency choice. 2 By this device, grounds
for license termination,5 8 conditions to be attached to certificates of convenience and necessity' and possibly some of the causes for the issuance
49. Statutes bestow this authority in varying terms, generally similar to those
of the Federal Communications Act, which authorizes the FCC to "make such rules
and regulations, . . . not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the
execution of its functions." 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1970). With respect to radio, the
Commission is authorized to "[m]ake such regulations not inconsistent with law as it
may deem necessary . . . to carry out the provisions of this chapter." 47 U.S.C. §
303(f) (1970). More generally, Congress has providedthat:
The head of an Executive [Cabinet] department or military department may
prescribe regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its
employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody,
use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property.

5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
50. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485
(1970) ; Shapiro, The Giwice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. Rxv. 921 (1965); Fuchs, Agency Development of
of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 NFv. U. L. REEV.781 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Fuchs, Agency Development].
51. See Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970) (general rulemaking
power held not to authorize regulations defining conduct subject to criminal prosecution).
As to limitations on the use of regulations to foreclose issues in agency adjudications,
see Fitzgerald, Adoption of Federal Power Commission Price-Changing Rides Without.
Evidentiary Hearing: Statutory Collision, 18 Sw. L.J. 236 (1964); Fuchs, Agencqy
Development, supra note 50, at 800-07.
52. General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971); American
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843

(1966).
53.
366 U.S.
54.
385 U.S.

Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
962 (1961).
American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
843 (1966).
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of cease-and-desist orders55 may be specified across the board in advance
with no further need for hearings upon them.
INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

To a greater extent than formerly, the actions of federal administrative agencies, including those that bear on the environment, are subject
to the check of judicial review. Several developments have contributed
to the expansion that has taken place: the emergence of a "presumption
of judicial reviewability," most recently based on the Administrative Procedure Act ;6 a willingness on the part of the courts to regard preliminary
agency action as subject to immediate review, and an enlargement of the
standing of interested persons and groups to bring review proceedings.
The first of these developments has resulted in a narrowing of the
range of agency actions that are regarded as discretionary in a sense
which immunizes them altogether from review by a court in a proceeding
otherwise properly brought. A limited range of agency determinations
remains beyond judicial scrutiny of the discretion that resides in them,
because political (including foreign) affairs or military57 factors or the
management of government business" are predominantly involved. Even
in relation to these areas of administration, however, courts are increasingly willing to determine the sometimes difficult issues of whether agency
action has statutory warrant,59 fulfills the agency's statutory duty,"0 is
55. Cf. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. F.T.C., 340 F. Supp. 1343
(D.D.C. 1972).
56. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967). See also Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410-14 (1971); Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-57 (1970) ; K. Davis, 4 Administrative Law Treatise
§ 28.07 (1958) ; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADmiNISTRATIVE ACTION, 336-53 (1965) ;
Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review I, 71 HARV. L. REv. 401 (1958).
57. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ;
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942); McQueary v. Laird, 449 F2d
608 (10th Cir. 1971) ; Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 128-33 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ; Pauling
v. McNamara, 331 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert denied, 377 U.S. 933 (1964).
Cf. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO
v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 760 (D.D.C. 1971).
58. Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 442-44 (2d Cir. 1969) (hospital personnel
matters); United States v. Walker, 409 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1969) (application for
mining claim) ; Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 395 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1968)
(refund for overpayment of postage). See generally K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE, SUPPLEMENT § 28.16 (1970); Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional
Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARv. L. REv. 367 (1968).

59. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (legality of other-than-honorable
discharge from the Army) ; Friedberg v. Resor, 453 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1971) (legality
of denial of conscientious objector release); Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793
(10th Cir. 1971) (validity of determination that national forest area is not eligible for
consideration as "primitive"); Cf. Ozbirman v. Regional Manpower Adm'r, 335 F.
Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (determination of effect of proposed wage of alien
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based on requisite procedures61 and, of course, cdnforms to constitutional
limitations.'
Agency determinations affecting the environment are
among those which are open to judicial scrutiny on these grounds."3
Agency action that is only indirectly enforceable is increasingly likely
to be immediately reviewable, without the need to await further action.
General regulations, for example, although their announcement terminates
the rulemaking proceedings from which they issue, depend for their effectuation, even when they have legal force, on action implementing them
by the agency (subject to judicial review) or by a court in the first instance. Arguably, therefore, the regulations are not "ripe" for review at
the time they are issued. Sometimes statutes contain provisions for
review,64 but even in their absence, regulations of this type have occasionally been directly reviewed in the past without the necessity to await
enforcement proceedings.65 Nevertheless, it required the decisions of the
Supreme Court in several recent drug regulation cases to establish firmly,
over strenuous dissent, the view that enforceable substantive regulations
often become reviewable upon issuance, by means of injunction or declaratory judgment proceedings, when they have immediate practical consequences for those affected.66 Even statements of policy that do not have
legal force but nevertheless have identifiable practical effects have recently
employee on domestic employment conditions); Kendler v. Wirtz, 388 F.2d 381 (3d
Cir. 1968) (validity of Sec'y of Labor's judgment that railroad employees were afforded
fair and equitable protection in respect to federal grant-in-aid for railroad commuter
service).
60. Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971) (duty of Secretary of the
Interior to regulate traders on Indian reservations) ; Sloan v. Department of Agriculture,
335 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Wash. 1971) (duty of Secretary of Agriculture to maintain
surplus commodities and food stamp programs simultaneously in an area with a severely
depressed economy).
61. Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney General, 454 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
62. See id.; Bethel Park v. Stans, 449 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1971) (validity of Bureau
of Census methods of gauging residency of certain classes of persons for purposes of
constitutionally required enumeration); Overseas Media Corp. v. McNamara, 385 F.2d
308, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
63. Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971); West Virginia
Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971) ; Citizens
Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 949 (1970).
64. The prototype of such statutes is § 701 (f) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (1970), which provides for direct review of certain regulations in the courts of appeals. Also note the review provision of the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 3628 (1970).
65. Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228 (1925); Houston v. St. Louis Independent
Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479 (1919); Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606 (1918); B.F. Goodrich
Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 829 (1953).
66. Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); Abbott Laboratories v.
rGardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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been held reviewable as "final orders" within the meaning of the Review
Act of 1950,7 which is applicable to several federal agencies."8
When a statute authorizes an agency to take temporary action pending final disposition of the matter before the agency, its interim action is
often immune from judicial review because of a legislative purpose to
make it so or because the short-run interests affected are thought not to
require further protection. Such is the case, for example, with decisions
to suspend or not suspend train discontinuances or carriers' newly filed
rates pursuant to statute, when these are subject to agency review,"9 and
may be the case with summary actions to prevent immediate harm to interests which the governing statute is designed to safeguard."0 A significant tendency has developed, however, especially in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, to review actions of this
kind in order to require due attention to the public interests involved, ineluding interests in the environment.71 By this means, relatively prompt
judicial intervention to secure adherence to statutory purposes becomes
possible.
Enlarged judicial recognition of the standing of persons and groups
to challenge agency determinations in litigation, which has also taken
place, involves the interpretation given to the Administrative Procedure
Act provision that any person "adversely affected or aggrieved" by agency
action "within the meaning of any relevant statute" shall be entitled to
judicial review of the action in an appropriate proceeding. 2 Numerous
other statutes, including some that antedate the Administrative Procedure Act, use the same or similar words to designate the persons authorized to commence statutory proceedings to review specific agency actions."
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2341 et seq. (1970).
68. Citizens Communications Center v. Burch, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
69. Port of New York Authority v. United States, 451 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1971);
Iowa State Commerce Comm'n v. United States, 27 Ad. L.2d 68 (S.D. Iowa 1970).
70. Cf. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
71. In Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and
Wellford v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court remanded for
further consideration certain administrative refusals to suspend the marketing of allegedly dangerous pesticides pending long-run determination of their marketability.
The Seventh Circuit declined to review the imposition of a suspension in Nor-Am
Agricultural Prod., Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970). See R. A. Holman
& Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962);
Note, -Non-Reviewability of Emergency Svspensio= Powers Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 46 IND. L.J. 238 (1971).
72. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
73. See, e.g., Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1970) ; Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77i (1970) ; Natural Gas Act, 15 US.C. § 717r(b) (1970) ; Federal
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825m(b) (1970) ; Review Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1970);

Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (6) (1970).
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A growing number of court decisions have held that individuals and
groups are "adversely affected or aggrieved" in the requisite sense if they
suffer adverse consequences in fact and, under the Administrative Procedure Act, if any other relevant statute brings the interest asserted within
the context of legal protection.'4 In addition, the Administrative Procedure Act provides that (as would be the case even without this provision)
"any person suffering legal wrong" because of agency action may seek
review of the action in a court." A large range of common law and constitutional rights may, in consequence, become the basis for obtaining
judicial review."6 By virtue, then, of the Administrative Procedure Act
and of legislation to secure particular interests 7 or by reason of common
law or constitutionally grounded claims,78 judicial review of a vast array
of agency determinations, including many that affect the environment,
may be had at the instance of many individuals and groups."9 Further,
74. The Supreme Court enunciated this formula in Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159 (1970).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
76. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152-53, 159-60
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). At times, without the aid of statutes, the
courts have upheld standing to secure review on the basis of "rights" that seem to have
no identifiable legal source. See, e.g., Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Co., 338 U.S.
621 (1950) ; International Ry. v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506 (1922) ; Independent BrokerDealers Trade Ass'n v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132, 140 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 828 (1971).
77. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Peoples v. Department of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Western Addition Community Organization v.
Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968). In Investment Co. Institute v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617 (1971), the statutory recognition of the interest asserted by the plaintiffs
was in a different statute from the one under which the agency action was taken and
was quite tenuous. Cf. id. at 639 (Harlan, J., dissenting). NEPA establishes procedures
to secure agency consideration of environmental factors which are of concern to individuals and groups whose interest, accordingly, is recognized by statute to this extent,
either for its own sake or as representative of larger public interests. Judicial review
extends to the determination of whether the procedures required by the Act have been
followed and whether the resulting determination is free of arbitrariness and illegality,
particularly because of failure to take due account of. the environmental factors. Cf. Aleut
League v. AEC, 337 F. Supp. 534, 542, 545 (D. Alaska 1971); Scherr v. Volpe, 336
F. Supp. 886 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
78. Among claims grounded in the common law is one to the maintenance of
public uses to which natural resources are adapted or have been dedicated. See Tarlock,
Book Review, 47 IND. L.J. 406, 412-14 (1972).
79. Sierra Club v. Morton, -U.S.-, 92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972), imposes the limitation
that those who sue must have more than an ideological interest in the particular subject
matter or, as groups, must represent members possessing a more tangible interest
The decision, denying standing in the particular case because of the absence of the requisite interest, does not derogate from the decisions, some of which are cited in the
opinion of the Court, in which standing has been upheld because such an interest was
present. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va.
1971), modified, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) ; Pennsylvania Environmental Council v.
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legislation authorizing any person to sue to halt or compel agency or
private action affecting the public interest in preservation of the environment"0 dispenses with the need to refer to any other law as a basis for
standing.
These enhanced possibilities of judicial review do not, of course,
make the courts available as a substitute for the agencies in the determination of policies involved in agency action; for the review that can be had
is limited in scope. It is restricted in part by applicable statutory formulas,
including the one contained in the Administrative Procedure Act,"' which
limit the grounds on which agency action may be set aside. These formulas are generally flexible, however; hence the principal restraint upon the
courts consists of their reluctance to interfere with agency responsibilities
bestowed by legislation and their sense of inadequacy to make expert
determinations.1 2 For the most part, the judicial check consists of enforcement of agency duties to follow specified procedures, to undertake serious
internal deliberations, to provide findings which give assurance of adherence to the obligation to consider relevant factors and to make determinations that are rationally based on evidence and carry out the applicable law. Such a check is inherently of uncertain scope when, as is
usually the case, the factors to be considered as relevant and the attention
they should receive depend on the interpretation of broad constitutional
or statutory terms. Nonetheless, insofar as courts are more sensitive to
environmental or other broad policy considerations than are the specialized agencies or, by virtue of judicial tenure and independence, are freer
to override the pressures of powerful special interests, judicial review can
and does operate as an important means of securing safeguards for longrun public interests which otherwise might be ignored or lightly overridden. 3
THE

POLITICAL CONTEXT

Despite all the expertness, careful procedure, sensitivity to the values
Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205

(D. Colo. 1970).

80. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970); Mich. Pub. Acts 1970 p. 390, Comp. LL. (Supp
1972) § 691.1201 et seq.

81. 5 U.S.C. § 705 (1970).
82. Typically, agency determinations in complicated situations are confirmed after
the reviewing court has ascertained that due consideration has been given to the factors
which are relevant. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d
463 (2d Cir. 1971), oert. denied -

U.S. -

(1972); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325

F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971); Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver,
320 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
83. These consequences are dramatically illustrated by the history of the Alaska
pipeline proceeding, discussed in note 45 supra.
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at stake and judicial objectivity that can be mustered, the ultimate outcome of agency policy determination, as of other governmental processes
in a democracy, depends on a resultant of social and cultural forces that
pull in different directions. Outcomes can be modified and purified to a
significant extent by imposing checks and balances and strengthening
rational processes of decision; but these refinements are ultimately subject to the willingness of people to tolerate and support the processes
involved and to accept the results to which they lead. Agencies harassed
by inadequate funding and by external pressures, as well as conditioned
by current values which their personnel share with the populace at large,
are not likely to effectuate with complete zeal the long-range purposes the
legislature may have been moved to utter in such legislation as the
National Environmental Policy Act, if these purposes conflict with immediate popular desires.84 The general run of courts, sharing the same
limitations to a lesser extent and confined by their restricted role, cannot
supply a complete corrective for the deficiencies that result.
The complex nature of many of the problems to be solved and the
inadequancy of current knowledge applicable to them, moreover, have the
consequence that demonstrably right or wrong answers are often not
possible. In these situations ultimate choices rest of necessity on the foresight of someone who exercises authority and shoulders responsibility,
taking cognizance of both political and technical factors. Whether the
trans-Alaska pipeline should be built or a power plant installed in some
location to serve human convenience and welfare at the cost of some
damage to the environment and, if so, what safeguards are to be required
are questions that must be answered, after all the evidence and arguments
are in, by the determinations of decision makers whose informed statesmanship provides the best answers that are humanly possible. The most
that can be claimed for any particular method of reaching decisions, including the use of agency processes to achieve stated purposes, is that it
affords superior opportunities for rationality and concern for the future
to play a leading role.
84. Cf. Caldwell, A National Policy for Energy, infra at 624; Jones, The Role of
Administrative Agencies as Instruments of Social Reform, 19 AD. L. REv. 279, 285-89

(1967).

